

COUNTRY REPORT: JAPAN

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In 2014, Japan faced significant policy adjustments, in accordance with international decisions in the field of fishery and marine living resource management. First, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) found that the Japanese whaling program breached the rules of the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling (ICRW). Secondly, Japan was involved in extensive negotiations for limiting the catches of tunas and eels in the international fishery fora. The first part of this report traces these processes and their outcomes, and reviews their impact on Japan's related policies. The second part of this report reviews Japan's new energy policy revised in 2014, and presents the continuing struggle for controlling the situation at the site of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant.

Part 1. Sustainable Use of Fishery Resources

1.1. Whaling

On March 31, 2014, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) ordered Japan to modify its whaling policy in the Antarctic Sea. The ICJ found that Japan's current whaling program in that ocean violated international obligations.¹ Japan has halted its whaling program in the Southern Ocean in accordance with this judgment.² However, the scope of the decision was limited to the question concerning the legitimacy of scientific whaling under Article VIII of the *International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling (ICRW)* in the concerned area.³ As indicated in the 65th meeting of the International Whaling Commission (IWC), held in Portoroz, Slovenia, in September 2014, the disagreement between those who view whaling

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¹ *Whaling in the Antarctic (Australia v. Japan: New Zealand intervening)*, Judgment, March 31, 2014, online: <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/148/18136.pdf>

² Policy towards the Future Whale Research Programs: Statement by Minister for Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, the Government of Japan, 18 April 2014, 3(1), online: <http://www.jfa.maff.go.jp/e/pdf/danwa.pdf>

³ Cymie R. Payne, "Australia v. Japan: ICJ Halts Antarctic Whaling" ASIL Insights (April 8, 2014), online: <http://www.asil.org/insights/volume/18/issue/9/australia-v-japan-icj-halts-antarctic-whaling>

as a possible method for wildlife resource management and those who believe that whaling should be banned has been left unresolved.

Judgment on 31 March 2014

The ICJ found that Japan violated provisions of the Schedule to the ICRW by conducting the whaling under the second phase of the Japanese Whale Research Program under Special Permit in the Antarctic (JAPRA II). The Court found that JAPRA II could broadly be characterized as scientific research, but also found that the evidence showed that the design and implementation of the programme was unreasonable in relation to the programme's objectives.

Australia claimed that JARPA II was not a program for purposes of scientific research within the meaning of Article VIII, paragraph 1, of the Convention. In Australia's view, Japan violated obligations stipulated in paragraphs 10(e), 7(b), 10(d), and 30 of the Schedule by issuing Special Permits for the killing, taking and treating of whales under JARPA II that did not fall into Article VIII.⁴ Japan contested alleged breaches and argued that JARPA II was a scientific research program and was covered by the exemption provided for in that provision.⁵

An essential question was whether the design and implementation of JARPA II were reasonable in relation to the stated scientific objectives. In reviewing the character of the program, the ICJ identified the standard of review applied to this dispute: the ICJ assessed, first, whether the program involved scientific research; second, if the use of lethal methods in the program's design and implementation was reasonable in terms of its stated objectives.⁶ The objective test of whether a program is for purposes of scientific research turned on "whether the design and implementation of a program are reasonable in relation to achieving the stated research objectives"⁷

⁴ Whaling in the Antarctic (Australia v. Japan: New Zealand intervening), supra note 1, at paras. 48-49.

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ *Ibid.*, at para. 67

⁷ *Ibid.*, at para. 97. Judge Yusuf criticized that the majority applied the standard of review that was "extraneous to Convention" instead of using applicable law, Article VIII of the Convention, paragraph 30 of the Schedule, and Annex P. Dissenting Opinion of Judge Yusuf, at paras. 9-17. <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/148/18148.pdf>

In applying the standard of review, the ICJ carefully limited its scope of judgment to investigate “whether the special permits granted in relation to JARPA II fall within the scope of Article VIII, paragraph 1, of the ICRW.”⁸ It avoided dealing with the matters of science and policy on whaling, though it noticed the existence of divergent opinions about the appropriateness of whaling.

The ICJ examined whether the use of lethal methods under JARPA II was reasonable in relation to its stated objectives.⁹ The Court did not consider the use of lethal method *per se* unreasonable in the relation to the research objectives of JARPA II.

On the other hand, the Court found that the scale of lethal sampling in the programme was unreasonable in relation to achieving its objectives. The Court pointed out several aspects suggesting unreasonableness of the programme.¹⁰ First, there was no clear basis supporting the considerable increase in the scale of lethal sampling in the JARPA II from JARPA whereas both programmes broadly overlapped in their objectives. Secondly, sample sizes for some species were too small to provide the information needed for statistical analysis. Thirdly, the sample size determination process for minke whales lacked transparency. Fourthly, Japan did not pay consideration to the feasibility of using non-lethal methods to achieve the JARPA II research objectives in order to reduce or eliminate the need for lethal sampling. Japan’s little attention to the possibility of using non-lethal methods was incompatible with obligations to respect IWC resolutions, Guidelines, and its own statement expressed that it did not use lethal methods more than it considered necessary for JARPA II objectives.¹¹ In addition, the Court considered the evidence suggested Japan’s “funding consideration, rather than strictly scientific criteria, played a role in the programme’s design” not to use non-lethal methods.¹²

Thus, the ICJ found the unreasonableness of the design and implementation of JARPA II in the relation to its stated objectives. The ICJ concluded that the special permits granted by

⁸ Judgment, *Ibid.*, at para. 69.

⁹ The Court identified the stated four objectives of JARPA II: (1) Monitoring of the Antarctic ecosystem; (2) Modelling competition among whale species and future management objectives; (3) Elucidation of temporal and spatial changes in stock structure; and (4) Improving the management procedure for Antarctic minke whale stocks. *Ibid.*, at paras. 113-118.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, at paras. 223-227.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, at paras. 137-144.

¹² *Ibid.*, at paras. 144 and 225.

Japan for the killing, taking and treating of whales in connection with JARPA II are not “for purposes of scientific research” pursuant to Article VIII, paragraph 1, of the Convention.¹³

IWC 2014

According to a statement released on 18 April 2014, Japan halted its whale research programme conducted in the Antarctic in FY 2014 in accordance with the judgment.¹⁴ On the other hand, regarding the whaling program engaged in the western North Pacific (the Second Phase of the Japanese Whale Research Program under Special Permit in the Western North Pacific (JARPN II)), Japan announced that it would limit the research objectives and reduce the scale of activities.¹⁵ In addition, with regard to continued whaling in 2015, various applicable measures, including non-lethal methods, will be taken in JARPN II.¹⁶ In November 2014, Japan drafted a new whaling programme in the Antarctic which is intended to be submitted to the IWC Secretariat and the Scientific Committee.¹⁷

In the 65th IWC plenary meeting, New Zealand’s proposed a draft resolution that requested “no further special permits for the take of whales are issued under existing research programmes or any new programme of whale research” until the Commission has reviewed the report of the Scientific Committee.¹⁸ The proposed resolution passed with 35 votes in favour, 20 against, 5 abstentions and 1 absence. This indicates that the divergent of opinions on whaling, which the ICJ avoided in its judgment, remain unresolved.

Japan has a duty to respect the judgment and adjust its whaling programme in line with the Court’s order. On the other hand, the judgment has a limited scope – it only applies to

¹³ *Ibid.*, at para. 227.

¹⁴ Policy towards the Future Whale Research Programs Statement by Minister for Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, the Government of Japan, 1 at 2. Available at <http://www.jfa.maff.go.jp/e/pdf/danwa.pdf>.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, at 1-2.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁷ Proposed Research Plan for New Scientific Whale Research Program in the Antarctic Ocean (NEWREP-A), The Government of Japan, available at <http://www.jfa.maff.go.jp/j/whale/pdf/newrep--a.pdf>

¹⁸ Draft Resolution for IWC 65, Whaling under Special Permit, Submitted by New Zealand, available at https://archive.iwc.int/pages/view.php?ref=3452&search=%21collection93&order_by=relevance&sort=DESC&offset=0&archive=0&k=&curpos=15

JARPA II in the light of relevant provisions and guidelines contained in the ICRW. Arbitrary stretching or shrinking of the meaning and scope of the judgment may impair the ICJ's authority to deal with scientific issues in the future.

1.2. Tuna

Japan is the biggest tuna consuming country, and the change of tuna resource management measure has an impact on Japanese fishery industries. In 2014, international fora on tuna management set up limits of catches of tunas in the Pacific and Atlantic areas.

Member States of the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC) agreed to halve catches of juvenile bluefin tuna weighing less than 30 kg from the 2002-2004 average.¹⁹ The participants also agreed not to increase catches of bluefin tuna 30 kg or larger from the 2002-2004 average level. Any catches above the set catch limit shall be deducted from the catch limit for the following year.²⁰

In October, the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission (IATTC) adopted a resolution on the measures for the conservation of bluefin tuna in the Eastern Pacific Ocean during 2015 and 2016.²¹ During 2015 and 2016, in the IATTC Convention Area, total commercial catches of Pacific bluefin tuna by all IATTC members and cooperating non-members (CPCs) shall not exceed 6,600 metric tons, for an effective annual catch of 3,300 metric tons in each year.²² The resolution also includes a target of effort that CPCs should endeavor to manage catches by vessels under their respective national jurisdictions with the objective of reducing the proportion of fish of less than 30 kg in the catch toward 50% of total catch.²³

¹⁹ WCPFC, *Conservation and Management Measure to Establish A Multi-Annual Rebuilding Plan for Pacific Bluefin Tuna*, 11th Regular Session (December 1-5, 2014), available at <https://www.wcpfc.int/system/files/CMM%202014-04%20Conservation%20and%20Management%20Measure%20to%20establish%20a%20multi-annual%20rebuilding%20plan%20for%20Pacific%20Bluefin.pdf>

²⁰ *Ibid.*, at 2.

²¹ Resolution C-14-06, *Measures for the Conservation and Management of Pacific Bluefin Tuna in the Eastern Pacific Ocean, 2015-2016*, available at <https://www.iattc.org/PDFFiles2/Resolutions/C-14-06-Conservation-of-bluefin-2015-2016.pdf>

²² *Ibid.*, at 2, para. 1.

²³ *Ibid.*, para. 3.

In contrast to the tougher catch limits in the Pacific Ocean, the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas decided to increase the Total Allowable Catch in the period of 2015-2017. Quotas from 2015 to 2017 increase approximately 20% to the previous year.²⁴

The Japan Fisheries Agency (JFA) announced its domestic measures for limiting catches to the National Conference on Resources and Aquaculture Management of Pacific Bluefin Tuna, on January 5, 2015.²⁵ JFA set up the allowable amount of juvenile catch from 8,015t to 4,007t in accordance with the 2014 WCPFC agreement. Among 4,007t of juvenile catch 2,000t is allocated to large and middle scale purse seine catch. The remaining 2,007 t is divided into six areas along the Japan's coast, and the catch limit is allocated to these areas based on the past records of catches. JFA will monitor and calculate the amounts of catches and will release different warnings to fishery industries when catch levels exceeds certain levels.

1.3. Japanese Eel

The listing of the Japanese eel on the IUCN Red List has accelerated the negotiation process to establish an international eel resource management framework between concerned parties, namely: Japan, China, Chinese Taipei, and South Korea. Based on the agreement reached in September, Japanese authorities promulgated the related act and allocated the amount of initial input of glass eels (elvers) into aquaculture ponds to business operators in Japan.

On September 17, Japan, China, Chinese Taipei, and South Korea held a meeting in order to set an international framework for eel resource management. It has been agreed to restrict the amount of initial input of glass eels taken from the wild into aquaculture ponds by farmers, by 20 percent from the amount reported in 2013, which was the largest use in the recent four years. The negotiating countries have also agreed to establish an

²⁴ Recommendation by ICCAT Amending the Recommendation 13-07 by ICCAT to Establish a Multi-Annual Recovery Plan for Bluefin Tuna in the Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean, at 3. Available at https://www.iccat.int/Documents/Recs/7312-14_ENG.PDF. Information provided by JFA is available at <http://www.jfa.maff.go.jp/j/press/kokusai/141118.html> (in Japanese)

²⁵ Japan Fisheries Agency, On Resource Management of Pacific Bluefin Tuna, available at <http://www.jfa.maff.go.jp/j/study/enoki/pdf/shiryo1.pdf> (in Japanese).

implementation mechanism for monitoring the agreed limits. The mechanism includes the establishment of domestic non-governmental associations in each country and also an international non-governmental organization for effective eel resource management.²⁶

On November 1, based on the *Inland Waters Fishery Promotion Act*,²⁷ eel aquaculture business operators in Japan are required to register their business with the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF).²⁸ According to the *Ordinance of the MAFF No. 53 (October 1, 2014)*, the operators shall submit their business plan, in which the amount of initial input of glass eels into their aquaculture ponds should be specified.²⁹

On November 14, JFA established a guideline to set up the limits of the amount of glass eels input.³⁰ The total allowable amount of the glass eel for initial input in FY2015 is 21.6t.³¹ The limits are decided through the parameters such as the average amount in the recent three years.³² The Appendix to the guideline shows that there are 466 registered business

²⁶ Joint Statement of the Bureau of Fisheries of People's Republic of China, the Fisheries Agency of Japan, the Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries of the Republic of Korea and the Fisheries Agency of Chinese Taipei on International cooperation for Conservation and Management of Japanese Eel Stock and Other Relevant Eel Species [hereinafter, Joint Statement], online: <http://www.jfa.maff.go.jp/j/saibai/pdf/140917jointstatement.pdf>.

"Initial input" does not include the transfer of glass eels taken from other aquaculture ponds within the Economy. Joint Statement, at 1, fn.1.

In accordance with the agreement, on October 30, a domestic non-governmental organization, Zen-Nippon Jizokuteki Youman Kikou (translation by author: All-Japan Sustainable Eel Farming Organization), is established. That organization will support monitoring the amount of actual input of glass eels with JFA, online: <http://news24.jp/articles/2014/10/30/06262416.html> (in Japanese).

²⁷ Kanpou, Gougai 144 (June 27, 2014) (Official Gazette, Extra No. 144, June 27, 2014) at 111-115, online: http://kanpou.npb.go.jp/20140627_old/20140627g00144/20140627g001440113f.html (in Japanese)

²⁸ Article 28 of the *Inland Waters Fishery Promotion Act*, *Ibid.* at 113.

<http://www.jfa.maff.go.jp/j/press/saibai/141031.html>

²⁹ Article 5(1) of the *Ordinance of the MAFF No. 53*, online: Kanpou, Gougai 218 (October 1, 2014) (Official Gazette, Extra No. 218, October 1, 2014)

http://kanpou.npb.go.jp/20141001_old/20141001g00218/20141001g002180003f.html (in Japanese)

³⁰ http://www.jfa.maff.go.jp/j/press/saibai/pdf/141114_1-01.pdf The guideline and its appendices are available in Japanese.

³¹ *Ibid.*, at 1, para. 2.

³² *Ibid.*, at 2, paras. 3-7.

operators.³³ Half of those operators are located in four prefectures: Aichi, Kagoshima, Miyazaki, and Shizuoka, and more than 85% (18.5t) of the total allowable amount is allocated to these four prefectures.³⁴

Since 2012, Japan, China, Chinese Taipei, South Korea, and, occasionally, the Philippines have held meetings for sharing information and strengthening cooperation for sustainable use of Japanese eel. However, they have failed to install a positive eel resource management system between them. It was the registration of Japanese eel in the Red List by the IUCN on 12 June, 2014³⁵, that accelerated the negotiation process to reach the agreement. The registration increases the possibility of Japanese eel to be listed in the Appendices of *the Washington Convention (CITES)*³⁶, as a subject of trade restrictions. In order to avoid stricter restrictions by CITES, the concerned countries have changed the direction of the negotiation to establishing an international framework for sustainable use of eel resource from maintaining their cooperative networks prioritizing domestic interests of farmers.

The significance of the agreement in September 2014 is the successful creation of a management framework that enables sustainable use of eel resources in the future, by reducing the amount of initial input of glass eels. However, the implementation of the agreement may be hampered by the fact that it is not legally binding. Hence, successful administration is not obligatory and there is no punishment for breaching the agreement. As the last paragraph of the Joint Statement says, further works are required for achieving effective conservation and management for eel stocks.³⁷

³³ http://www.jfa.maff.go.jp/j/press/saibai/pdf/141114_1-02.pdf

³⁴ http://www.jfa.maff.go.jp/j/press/saibai/pdf/141114_1-02.pdf

³⁵ <http://www.iucn.org/?14964/IUCN-Red-List-raises-more-red-flags-for-threatened-species>. See Jacoby, D. & Gollock, M. 2014. *Anguilla japonica*. The IUCN Red List of Threatened Species. Version 2014.2. <www.iucnredlist.org>. Downloaded on 17 September 2014.

³⁶ Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, 993 UNTS 243.

³⁷ Joint Statement, *supra* note 28, at para. 4.

Part 2. Japan's Basic Energy Plan: Back to Nuclear Power Generation

2.1. Basic Energy Plan 2014

On April 11, 2014, the Japanese Cabinet approved the new *Strategic Energy Plan* under the *Basic Act on Energy Policy*.³⁸ This is the first occasion for Japan to set up its comprehensive energy policy, after the Great Eastern Earthquake and the subsequent nuclear incident which occurred at the site of TEPCO Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant. After the Earthquake, in 2011, in order to facilitate the construction of safety countermeasures, such as a tide embankments, and to implement stress tests, all nuclear power plants in Japan were shut down by May 2012.

The Plan reviews changes of the energy supply-demand structure Japan is facing after the 2011 Earthquake. Japan's energy self-sufficiency rate, as of 2012, declined to 6.0% after all the nuclear power plants were shut down. Halt of the nuclear power generation resulted in an increase of imports of oil and natural gas, as alternative power sources, and Japan's reliance on fossil fuels as a power source rose up from 60% to 90%. The rise of dependency on fossil fuels in the power sector caused the expansion of Japan's trade deficit, the growth of energy cost, and increased greenhouse gas emissions.

The Plan emphasizes Japan's vulnerability in relying on the import of energy and the need to create an optimal energy supply-demand structure for Japan. For the relations with resource-supplying nations, the Plan suggests that Japan ought to maintain strategically diversified supply sources that may reduce the risk of unstable supply. With regard to energy demand, the Plan points out the need for an advanced energy-saving strategy. The *Act on the Rational Use of Energy (Act No. 49 of June 22, 1979)*³⁹ obliges business operators of factory, transportation, and construction who have certain amount of energy consumption (more than 1,500 kl/year) to report their energy efficiency measures and improvement of

³⁸ Strategic Energy Plan, April, 2014 (in Japanese),

<http://www.meti.go.jp/press/2014/04/20140411001/20140411001-1.pdf>

English version (provisional translation) is available at

http://www.enecho.meti.go.jp/en/category/others/basic_plan/pdf/4th_strategic_energy_plan.pdf

[hereinafter Plan].

The Basic Act on Energy Policy (Act No. 71 of June 14, 2002). English translation is available at

<http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp/law/detail/?vm=04&id=123&re=02>

³⁹ *Act on the Rational Use of Energy (Act No. 49 of June 22, 1979)* English translation is available at

<http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp/law/detail/?id=1855&vm=04&re=02>

efficiency of energy consuming every year, to the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, Japan.⁴⁰ From April 2014, the amended *Act on the Rational Use of Energy* has come into force that promotes equalizing electricity demand.⁴¹

In addition to the energy-saving activities, the Plan aims to accelerate the introduction of renewable energy. However, it also points out that the introduction of wind and geothermal power involves additional challenges on coordination with local communities, cost, and environmental assessment.⁴² The Plan considers solar power as a promising source, though it also has problems of high generation cost and unstable output. The Feed-in-tariff system that has been in place since July 2012, under the *Act on Special Measures Concerning Procurement of Electricity from Renewable Energy Sources by Electricity Utilities (Act No. 108 of August 30, 2011)*,⁴³ promotes investments in renewable energy, especially, for small to medium scale solar power generation.

Moreover, the Plan considers that nuclear energy is a base-load power source as a low carbon and quasi-domestic energy source and declares Japan's re-establishment of the nuclear energy policy.⁴⁴ The Plan indicates the direction of the nuclear energy policy, on which the Government of Japan will follow the Nuclear Regulation Authority (NRA)'s judgment as to whether nuclear plants meet the new regulatory requirements and will proceed with the restart of plants.⁴⁵ However, the Plan also mentions that the dependency on nuclear power generation will be lowered to the possible extent by using renewable energy, power saving, and other technological development.⁴⁶

⁴⁰ Article 2(1) of the *Order for Enforcement of the Act on the Rational Use of Energy (Act No. 49 of June 22, 1979)*: Latest Amendment, December 27, 2013, Order for Enforcement No. 370. Available at <http://law.e-gov.go.jp/htmldata/S54/S54SE267.html> (in Japanese)

⁴¹ Article 1 of the Amended *Act on the Rational Use of Energy (Act No. 49 of June 22, 1979)*. Available at <http://law.e-gov.go.jp/htmldata/S54/S54HO049.html> (in Japanese)

⁴² Plan, *supra* note 40 at 42-44.

⁴³ Act on Special Measures Concerning Procurement of Electricity from Renewable Energy Sources by Electricity Utilities (Act No. 108 of August 30, 2011) English translation is available at <http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp/law/detail/?id=2230&vm=04&re=01>

⁴⁴ Plan, *supra* note 40, at 24.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

2.2. Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant

TEPCO reported to NRA, on February 20, 2014, on the incident of water leakage at the site of Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant pursuant to Article 62-3 of *the Act on Regulation of Nuclear Source Material, Nuclear Fuel Material and Reactors*.⁴⁷ Highly radioactive water leaked from the upper part of Tank C-1 in H-6 Tank Area, where contaminated water was stored. The amount of water leaked from the storage tank was estimated to be approximately 100 m³.⁴⁸ TEPCO has suffered a number of problems since 2011, including a series of contaminated water leaks.⁴⁹ According to the Plan, it is expected to take 30 - 40 years to solve the issues related to measures for the decommissioning the TEPCO Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plants and the contaminated water.⁵⁰

Conclusions

When Washoku (Japanese cuisine) was registered in the representative list of Intangible Cultural Heritage of Humanity by the UNESCO in 2013, the Intergovernmental Committee described the Japanese dietary tradition as an essential part of Japanese cultural identity and stated that the dietary tradition “is associated with an essential spirit of respect for nature that is closely related to the sustainable use of natural resources.”⁵¹ In 2014, the issues raised by wildlife management affected the Japanese fishery industries and the related policies. Japan has a duty to ensure sustainability of the use of marine living resources in future.

Still about 140,000 people are being forced to live as evacuees three years after the nuclear accident at Fukushima. In addition, issues related to decommissioning, such as leakage of contaminated water, are a major cause for concern, not only for Japan, but also for the

⁴⁷ Act on Regulation of Nuclear Source Material, Nuclear Fuel Material and Reactors (Act No. 166 of June 10, 1957). English translation is available at

<http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp/law/detail/?id=1941&vm=04&re=02>

⁴⁸ News Release, NRA, Japan, 20 February, 2014, p. 4:

http://www.nsr.go.jp/committee/kisei/h25fy/data/0044_06.pdf

⁴⁹ BBC News “Japan's Fukushima nuclear plant leaks radioactive water” (February 20, 2014), online:

<http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-26254140>

⁵⁰ Plan, *supra* note 40 at 47-49.

⁵¹ DECISION 8.COM 8.17, ITH/13/8.COM/Decisions at 42-43 (Online:

<http://www.unesco.org/culture/ich/doc/src/ITH-13-8.COM-Decisions-EN.doc>).

international community. Effective countermeasures and continuous efforts to solve these issues are an essential basis for the new energy policy.