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**Student Incentive Structures in Classroom Simulations:  
The Case of Post-Kyoto Climate Negotiations**

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**Abstract:**

This paper presents an in-class simulation of post-Kyoto climate negotiations, which has been included in a "Comparative Environmental Policy" course over the past eight years. Students, representing individual countries are presented with a negotiating text derived from the preparatory documents for the 2000 sixth Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change negotiations in The Hague. The document contains a series of bracketed sections of text. The students are also presented with a customized incentive structure for their country. The incentive structure contains a series of point totals that their country would receive or lose depending on which bracketed sections of text are included or removed from the text as well as the effects of specific countries signing or refusing to sign the final treaty. Based upon a review of the negotiating text, analysis of the incentive structure, and outside research on the country's position in the climate negotiations, each student must prepare a country position paper and then participate in approximately five hours of negotiations to attempt to finalize a treaty text. Part of the grade for the simulation is based on the point totals that the students secure for their countries in the negotiations. The use of the incentive structure and its effect on the final grade create a situation where students are less willing to compromise on issues critical to their country, and it forces them to utilize issue linkage to generate creative solutions to deadlock in the negotiations. It also demonstrates the importance of 'veto coalitions' in the negotiating process. The paper will review the effectiveness of the simulation, and it will analyze the pedagogical advantages and disadvantages of incorporating incentive structures into simulations and the grading process.

This paper is divided into three sections. The first section presents an overview and discussion of a classroom simulation of the November 2000 sixth Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP-6) negotiations. Each student represents a country in the international negotiations. One of the unique aspects of this simulation is a set of customized incentive structures that are linked to each country's position on a range of alternative proposals contained in the negotiating text. Part of the grade for the simulation is based on the point totals that the students secure for their countries in the negotiations. The second section of the paper reviews the pedagogical advantages and disadvantages of incorporating incentive structures into simulations and the grading process. The final section of the paper contains all of the materials associated with the simulation.

### **Overview of the Simulation**

This simulation is designed for a course in comparative environmental policy in industrial countries with an emphasis on European and American environmental policy. The course meets twice per week for seventy-five minutes per meeting, and it typically enrolls between twenty and twenty-five junior and senior political science and environmental studies majors/minors. The key questions under study in the course are: 1) How do differences across countries in political institutions, political culture, regulatory style, and economic structure influence domestic and foreign environmental policies? The course focuses in particular on how scientific evidence is introduced and interpreted in the policy process. 2) What impact do these differences have on the ability of states to resolve domestic environmental problems and achieve cooperative solutions to common transnational environmental problems? 3) What influence do international environmental interactions have on domestic environmental policy? This simulation is designed as a capstone exercise for the course. The final two weeks of the class focus on the politics of climate change and evaluate how the problem was initially defined in key countries and how these countries then pursued domestic and foreign policy responses to climate change. The simulation allows the students to apply the material from the course to a concrete case study of the politics of climate change.

The simulation takes as its starting point the November 2000 negotiations in The Hague to finalize the rules to implement the Kyoto Protocol. In preparation for the simulation, the students receive a list of possible countries to represent in the negotiations (see appendix I), and they are then asked to rank order their top five choices. Student country assignments are made based upon the students' preferences and the need to include countries representing a variety of positions. In addition, two students are chosen to serve as part of the secretariat for the negotiations. They are responsible for coordinating the logistics for the negotiations and running the various breakout sections.

Approximately two weeks prior to the negotiations, the students are presented with a draft negotiating text derived from the from the Kyoto Protocol to the Framework Convention on Climate Change and preparatory documents for COP-6, which were simplified and adapted for use in this class (see appendix II). The agreement contains a series of bracketed alternative

language proposals for the agreement. For example, Article 3.15 contains the following language, “The acquisition of emission reduction units through flexibility mechanisms (including joint implementation, emission trading, and the clean development mechanism) may comprise up to [25%; 50%; 75%; 100%] of a country’s emission reductions required under Annex B.” The students are tasked with completing negotiations to eliminate all brackets from the text and to achieve a final agreement acceptable to all or nearly all participants.

In preparation for the simulation, students produce a five to seven page negotiating position that addresses their country’s position on the disputed provisions in the proposed agreement. The position paper is supposed to begin with a general introduction to the country’s understanding of the threat of climate change, followed by an explanation of the specific interests related to the provisions in the draft negotiating text. The students also assemble background information and assess the likely costs and benefits of addressing climate change for their country. The writing assignment is critical to helping the students understand their country and its interests in the negotiations. It also forces the students to engage the negotiating text and master its finer details to understand their country’s positions on each of the disputed elements. The students thus enter the actual negotiating session with a firmer grasp of the issues at stake for their country.

One week prior to the negotiating session, the two members of the secretariat begin to contact the students to gauge the broad parameters for a possible deal. One member of the secretariat serves as a liaison to the developing countries and the other works with the developed states. The secretariat then begins to advise students on the issues on which agreement should be fairly easy and those areas that will be more difficult to resolve. The students are also encouraged to begin to engage the other class members in informal consultations and to forge working arrangements with countries that share similar interests in the negotiations. The class prior to the negotiating session is devoted to a thorough review of the negotiating text and preliminary discussions of areas of agreement and disagreement.

The simulation is scheduled for a three hour session outside of the normal class time. The date and time are established at the beginning of the semester, and student attendance is required. The simulation begins with a plenary session where the secretariat outlines the process for the negotiations. Following the initial briefing, the students split into developing country and developed country caucuses to discuss their positions in separate meeting rooms. After 30 to 45 minutes, the plenary session reconvenes with one or more delegates from each of the caucuses presenting their group’s position(s) on the negotiating text. The members of the secretariat map the areas of agreement and disagreement on an overhead projection. Following the statements and initial debate, the plenary session again recesses and moves into an informal gathering for refreshments and discussion among delegates for approximately one hour. At this point small groups begin to form with contacts being made among developing and developed country representatives. Delegates identify common interests and form alliances to press for compromises that can meet each country’s minimum requirements. Once alternative packaged proposals are finalized, the delegates meet again in plenary session to negotiate the final text. The process typically involves public debate as well as frequent informal negotiations on the side.

This simulation, in various permutations, has been administered in six class sections over the past eight years. The students have successfully achieved an agreement in five of the six classes. The debriefing process has been conducted in various ways over the years, but the process that seems to work best is to hold the simulation in lieu of the penultimate class. Part of the final class meeting can then be devoted to a discussion of the simulation.

Assigning student grades for the simulation involves two components. First, two thirds of the grade is based on the written country position statement. The final third is assigned based upon the ability of the students to negotiate an agreement that fulfills their country's interests in the negotiations. Each bracketed provision is associated with a positive or negative score in the incentive structure customized for each state (see appendices IV and V). The scores are totaled to determine student grades in the exercise based on the provisions contained in the final agreement. For example, if the provisions included in the final text produce a final score greater than 650 points, the student would receive an 'A', 600 points an 'A-', etc. (see appendix IV) The incentive structure will be discussed in detail below.

### ***Pedagogical Objectives***

The simulation is designed as a capstone experience for the course. The students have spent the semester studying domestic environmental policy processes across countries and analyzing attempts by states to address transnational environmental problems. They have also closely studied the case of climate change. This simulation thus provides an opportunity for students to apply the material that they have studied to a detailed case study. In addition, the simulation is intended to provide an in-depth understanding of the provisions of the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. This is a critical agreement that will have profound repercussions for the global environment as well as substantially affecting environmental, commercial, energy, and taxation policies across the world. It is thus important for students to have a good understanding of the provisions and operation of the protocol. The simulation is also intended to illustrate to students the difficulty of achieving agreements through international negotiations. Students often naïvely believe that solutions to transnational environmental problems are obvious and that it should not be so hard to come to an agreement to resolve these problems. The exercise helps the students to understand the two-level game that is typically involved in the negotiations. It forces them to view the negotiations from the perspective of other countries and in light of the domestic politics of those countries. They also achieve a greater appreciation for the compromises that are necessary to achieve agreement. Finally, the negotiating text challenges the students to engage and understand a complex, legal document. Many students have commented on the initial difficulty in interpreting the document, but they also note the satisfaction that they achieved in mastering it.

### **Incentive Structures in Simulations**

One of the unique aspects of the simulation is the use of an incentive structure to guide students in the negotiations. Two sample incentive structures for the negotiations are included below. The incentive structure refers to the articles in the negotiating text (see appendix II). For example, Article 3.16 deals with whether developing countries "may voluntarily" accept emission limitations, "shall" accept emission limitations, or whether any reference to developing country emission limitations should be deleted. The United States was adamant that developing countries should make some form of commitment; thus, incorporating developing countries into the agreement would result in a large point bonus for the United States, and failure to include language involving developing countries would result in a significant loss for the US. The incentive structure reflects these calculations for the United States. For China, on the other hand, incorporating developing country commitments into the agreement was unacceptable. The Chinese incentive structure represents this situation as well (see appendix V).

## China

Art. 3.16	delete 3.16 may voluntarily shall	250 -100 -300
Art. 3.15	25% 50% 75% 100%	120 40 -80 -160
Art. 6	Delete Art. 6	135
Art. 6.1	Annex I Annex I - former Communist All Annex B (+ Developing)	80 110 -125
Art. 6.5	2008-2012 after 2012 after 2012 and further study	-75 40 100
Art. 10C	Delete Art. 10C	-325
Art. 10C.2	Establish TTM Delete 10C.2	250 -50
Art. 10C.3	Further Study Delete 10C.3	-70 75
Art. 10C.4	Non-Commercial Terms Commercial Terms	275 -35
Art. 11A.3	10% 50% 100% 200%	-40 10 50 120
Art. 11A.4	Developing Countries Developing & Oil Producing	25 -25
Art. 12	Delete CDM	-240
Art. 12.10	Government-Government Any Actor New Panel	135 -25 185
Art. 12.11	Reduce Emissions Emissions & Sinks	75 -10
Art. 12.12	Must Accept Need Not Accept	-260 200
Art. 17	Delete Art. 17	150
Art. 17.2	2008-2012 after 2012 after Review	-80 -30 70
Art. 17.3	Annex I Annex I - former Communist All Annex B (+ Developing)	50 125 -110
Annex B	Argentina/Brazil/India - All No Commitment Argentina/Brazil/India No Commitment - points per country 10% - points per country 20% - points per country 50% - points per country	100 30 -300 -200 -150
Annex B	China No Commitment 10% 20% 50%	150 -675 -500 -400
Annex B	Saudi Arabia/OPEC/Nigeria/Venezuela All No Commitment 10% - points per country 20% - points per country 50% - points per country	-20 -20 -10 0

## United States

Art. 3.16	delete 3.16 may voluntarily shall	-300 130 275
Art. 3.15	25% 50% 75% 100%	-200 -50 50 150
Art. 6	Delete Art. 6	-150
Art. 6.1	Annex I Annex I - former Communist All Annex B (+ Developing)	35 -40 160
Art. 6.5	2008-2012 after 2012 after 2012 and further study	125 35 -60
Art. 10C	Delete Art. 10C	75
Art. 10C.2	Establish TTM Delete 10C.2	-75 45
Art. 10C.3	Further Study Delete 10C.3	5 -10
Art. 10C.4	Non-Commercial Terms Commercial Terms	-200 100
Art. 11A.3	10% 50% 100% 200%	50 0 -35 -150
Art. 11A.4	Developing Countries Developing & Oil Producing	50 -150
Art. 12	Delete CDM	-100
Art. 12.10	Government-Government Any Actor New Panel	-75 50 -100
Art. 12.11	Reduce Emissions Emissions & Sinks	-40 100
Art. 12.12	Must Accept Need Not Accept	85 5
Art. 17	Delete Art. 17	-300
Art. 17.2	2008-2012 after 2012 after Review	150 25 -100
Art. 17.3	Annex I Annex I - former Communist All Annex B (+ Developing)	55 -100 165
Annex B	Argentina/Brazil/India - All No Commitment Argentina/Brazil/India No Commitment - points per country 10% - points per country 20% - points per country 50% - points per country	-100 -40 100 50 25
Annex B	China No Commitment 10% 20% 50%	-150 350 200 100
Annex B	Saudi Arabia/OPEC/Nigeria/Venezuela All No Commitment 10% - points per country 20% - points per country 50% - points per country	-20 200 150 120

The incentive structure thus encourages students to think about tradeoffs and compromises that will be necessary to meet the needs of all participants. The combination of incentive structures is designed in such a way that it is impossible for all students to get an 'A' for the negotiations, but it is possible for any individual country to achieve an 'A' based on its incentive structure. In practice every country in at least one of the six simulations has received an 'A' or an 'A-' in the negotiations. To simulate the leverage that powerful countries have over other countries, the incentive structures also include provisions for the effects of a country refusing to sign an agreement. The box to the right lists the point deductions related to each country refusing to sign the final agreement. It is intended

If a country does not sign the Protocol, the signatories to the agreement will have their scores docked by the number associated with the non-signing countries:	
United States	-250
Any Member State of the European Union	-250
China/Japan (each)	-150
Russia/India/Brazil (each)	-100
Australia/Argentina/Switzerland/Norway (each)	- 50
Tuvalu/Costa Rica/Venezuela/Saudi Arabia (each)	- 10

to be broadly indicative of the relative influence of the states in the negotiations. The students are unaware of the weighting of countries when they select their states. They often complain that the point deductions are unfair, but it provides a useful teaching tool to illustrate the relative influence of states in the negotiations. However, students often comment that the relative power of countries is not decisive in the negotiations. The maneuvering of smart, motivated delegates from smaller countries can often identify compromises and move the negotiations forward to benefit them.

### ***Evaluating the Use of Incentive Structures***

The advantage of the incentive structure is that it creates an inducement for students to negotiate aggressively for their country's interests and to accurately represent their country's position within the negotiations. Without the incentive structure, there is a tendency for students to compromise quickly to achieve an early agreement despite the fact that their countries would not accept those compromises. The incentive structure makes the negotiating process more difficult, but it also motivates students to work hard to find a solution. The first few times that the simulation was administered, the students identified loopholes in the incentive structure that were unanticipated and found ways for almost everyone to receive an 'A'. The students are very creative and work hard to find solutions to the problem. As these loopholes were closed, the negotiations became much more difficult. In fact, when the simulation was administered this fall, the negotiations ended in deadlock, and the United States, Australia, and Japan walked out. After assessing the penalties associated with their refusal to sign the agreement, the other students could not achieve an agreement that would meet their minimum point requirements to sign the agreement. The negotiations thus ended in deadlock, and all students with the exception of the oil producing countries received a 'B-' for this part of the exercise.<sup>1</sup>

The debriefing for the fall simulation was fascinating. The final round of negotiations was very heated. The delegates believed that they had finalized an agreement. At the last minute the European delegates raised objections, and the American, Japanese, and Australian delegates stormed out of the session in anger. However, in the debriefing, the students nearly unanimously praised the experience. Several students noted their frustration and anger at the inability to come to an agreement. They were particularly frustrated when it became apparent that they were one compromise away from a solution that would have been viable. However, after three hours of intense negotiations, they were tired, frustrated, and unwilling to continue the exercise. The students commented on how they could understand the failure of the negotiations in The Hague. A discussion of the parallels between their simulation experience and the outcome of the negotiations in The Hague was very fruitful.

Their comments were reminiscent of an exchange after the failure of The Hague negotiations. A subset of European and American negotiators had concluded a tentative agreement that later collapsed following its rejection by a broader European contingent. Commenting on the failed agreement, American negotiator, Frank Loy, asserted that "we [the European and American delegates] physically shook hands. . . . I asked, 'Are we now in full agreement; is this a deal?' I

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<sup>1</sup> One of the other provisions of the exercise is that the oil producing countries receive an 'A+' if they can maneuver to have either the United States or the European Union Countries refuse to sign the agreement. In the fall simulation, the oil producing countries surreptitiously negotiated a series of mutually inconsistent agreements with other countries and then reneged on all of the agreements at the last minute. This was one of the events that led to the frustration and anger among the other delegates and forced the deadlock. The time wasted negotiating with the oil producing countries led the other countries away from the negotiations that were necessary to salvage the agreement.

was pointing to a piece of paper. They said 'yes'.<sup>2</sup> Following the EU's rejection of the agreement, Loy presciently noted that "I think it is fair to say that that was a pretty important opportunity that was not cashed in on."<sup>3</sup> The French Environment Minister and head of the EU delegation, Dominique Voynet, rejected that view, arguing that "this compromise is completely one-sided; it transfers the Protocol on reducing greenhouse gas emissions into a Protocol that, on the contrary, would authorize an increase in emissions by 2010. If we accept it, it will open loopholes that would then be very difficult to close."<sup>4</sup>

While the incentive structure is a valuable tool for motivating students and simulating the difficult decisions that must be made, it also has its problems. Many students noted that while the negotiations began with discussion of the merits of the various proposals, by the end of the negotiations the focus had shifted almost entirely to point totals, and the substance was completely lost in the discussions. This is certainly problematic, but it is also not too far from the reality of the negotiating process. In the final hours of negotiations, the focus becomes an acceptable compromise, and the broader implications of the agreement are often lost. In the simulation, it has often been an interjection from the representative of Tuvalu that brings a greater sense of purpose to the process. In at least three of the simulations, the representatives from Tuvalu made impassioned pleas for states to stop the haggling about flexibility mechanisms/sinks and focus on the need to reduce global GHG emissions before their islands sink below the seas. Several students noted in the debriefings that the interventions by Tuvalu were very powerful and did help to focus minds – though the emphasis remained on the point totals.

Another significant drawback is that the students are unable to completely control the portion of their grade related to the point totals. Certain countries are better placed to achieve their interests than others. However, this exercise is a small part of the overall grade for the course, and students have tended to support receiving a grade for the negotiations.

The other significant drawback of the incentive structure is that students do not need to determine what their country's position on the various provisions should be; rather, they can deduce their positions based on the incentives. They do not have to find the answer for themselves. However, part of the challenge of the writing assignment is to force the students to determine why their country would take the position implied by the incentive structure. In the end, this is probably more useful for the exercise.

## Conclusion

This exercise has generated a great deal of interest and excitement among the students. The students have overwhelmingly expressed the view that the exercise contributed significantly to their understanding of the course material and their interest specifically in the politics of climate change. It is certainly apparent on the final examination that students across the board are able to effectively address questions related to the politics of climate change and to draw connections between the climate negotiations and the courses conceptual material. While the exercise is complex and consumes a great deal of time and energy, it appears to successfully fulfill its educational objectives.

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<sup>2</sup> Andrew C. Revkin, "Treaty Talks Fail to Find Consensus in Global Warming," *New York Times* (11/26/00), 1.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid.

<sup>4</sup> "EU/UN: Unholy Compromise to Drag Climate Talks out of the Mire," *European Report* (11/25/00), No. 2547.

## Climate Change Negotiation Simulation Preparation

Each of you will be asked to select a country or regional organization to represent in the climate negotiations. In addition, two of you will need to act as the secretariat for the negotiations. The list below is indicative of the positions adopted by some of the key players. You may choose a country not on this list, but it is important to have representation from each of the four groups below. Please send me an e-mail by Friday containing the rank ordering your first through fifth choices as well as indicating whether you would be willing to serve as part of the secretariat. I will assign the countries on Monday and provide you with the negotiating text and your incentive structures.

### *Country Groupings in the Climate Negotiations*

	<u>Proactive</u>	<u>Opposed/Skeptical</u>
<b>Industrial Countries</b>	EU, Germany, France, UK, Italy, Spain	Australia, US, Norway New Zealand, Canada
	Japan, Russia Switzerland, Poland	
<b>Developing Countries</b>	Tuvalu, Malaysia, China, India, Argentina Mexico, South Korea, Brazil, Costa Rica	Saudi Arabia, Nigeria, Venezuela

In preparation for the negotiations you will need to prepare a 5 to 7 page negotiating position paper for your country on a set of alternative texts, which I will provide on Monday. Your position should begin with a general introduction to your country's understanding of the threat of climate change (no more than 1 to 1½ pages). This should be followed by an explanation of your specific interests related to the provisions in the draft negotiating text. Before you prepare your position you will need to assemble some background information on your country and the likely costs and benefits of addressing climate change. I will provide you with sources to find this material after you have selected the countries you will represent.

As you prepare for the session you will need to assemble the following information on your country and include it in a statistical appendix at the end of your negotiating position. The appendix will not count toward the 5 to 7 page position statement limit.

#### Statistics:

- 1) Total emissions of carbon dioxide
- 2) Per capita emissions of carbon dioxide
- 3) Carbon dioxide emissions per dollar of GDP
- 4) Sectoral composition of carbon emissions (i.e. percent of total emissions from the transportation sector, energy sector, industry, etc.)

As you prepare your position, you should be aware of these political variables:

- 1) What policies has your government already undertaken to manage carbon dioxide emissions?
- 2) Which sectors will likely have to bear the costs of regulations to reduce carbon emissions?
- 3) What are the likely costs of inaction on climate change?
- 4) Who will bear the costs of inaction within your country?
- 5) Which domestic interest groups have the most influence on climate policy decisions?
- 6) What are the positions of the major parties and politicians on climate change?
- 7) How would you describe domestic public opinion on climate change?
- 8) What role have non-governmental organizations played in the climate policy process?
- 9) What role has science played in your climate policy process?
- 10) Have international organizations or other countries influenced your state's climate policy?
- 11) Are there other issues that your country might like to link to climate change that would provide for tradeoffs in the climate negotiations?

Put yourself in the position of a negotiator for your country. You must represent the interests of your country (as defined by your domestic political establishment) to the best of your abilities—whether you agree with your country's position or not. You must first establish your country's preferences in the negotiations. You must then decide, based on these preferences, what your country's position on each of the provisions in the draft text will be.

Prior to the beginning of the negotiations, you will present the information outlined above and your country's position on the negotiating text. You must then seek to reach an agreement on the protocol's final text.

Your grade on the negotiations will be split between the written negotiating position you prepare and your ability to achieve your state's interests in the negotiations. I will provide you with additional information regarding the grading of the negotiations themselves prior to the beginning of the negotiating session.

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**COLLEGE OF THE HOLY CROSS GROUP ON IMPLEMENTING THE KYOTO  
PROTOCOL****1st and Only Session****Worcester, MA****COMPLETION OF A PROTOCOL****Consolidated negotiating text by the Chairman**

The following negotiating text consists of information taken from the Kyoto Protocol to the Framework Convention on Climate Change and United Nations preparatory documents for COP6 which have been adapted for use in this class. Article numbers refer to the Kyoto Protocol.

**Article 3: Quantitative Commitments**

1. The Parties included in Annex I shall, individually or jointly, ensure that their aggregate anthropogenic carbon dioxide equivalent emissions of the greenhouse gases listed in Annex A do not exceed their assigned amounts, calculated pursuant to their qualified emission limitation and reduction commitments inscribed in Annex B and in accordance with the provisions of this Article, with a view to reducing their overall emissions of such gases by at least 5 percent below 1990 levels in the commitment period 2008 to 2012.
  
15. The acquisition of emission reduction units through flexibility mechanisms (including joint implementation, emission trading, and the clean development mechanism) may comprise up to [25%; 50%; 75%; 100%] of a country's emission reductions required under Annex B.
  
16. [Non Annex I parties [may voluntarily; shall] adopt emission limitation and reduction commitments. Such commitments shall be included in Annex B.]

**Article 6: Joint Implementation**

1. For the purpose of meeting its commitments under Article 3, any Party included in [Annex I; Annex I excluding countries in transition; Annex B including non Annex I countries undertaking emission reduction commitments] may transfer to, or acquire from, any other such Party emission reduction units earned through mutually agreed joint implementation projects.
  
5. Joint Implementation may be used by countries to meet emission reduction commitments made for the period [2008-2012; after 2012, after 2012 pending further study].
  
6. A project under the activities implemented jointly (AIJ) pilot phase will be eligible to be pursued as a project under Article 6 if the project meets the criteria established in these

guidelines, and if the Parties involved in the project agree that it should be considered as an Article 6 project.

#### **Article 10C: Technology Transfer**

1. All Parties shall cooperate in the promotion of effective modalities for the development, application and diffusion of, and take all practicable steps to promote, facilitate and finance, as appropriate, the transfer of, or access to, environmentally sound technologies, know-how, practices and processes pertinent to climate change, in particular to developing countries, including the formulation of policies and programmes for the effective transfer of environmentally sound technologies that are publicly owned or in the public domain and the creation of an enabling environment for the private sector, to promote and enhance the transfer of, and access to, environmentally sound technologies.
2. [The Secretariat shall develop a Technology Transfer Mechanism (TTM) to assist developing country Parties to obtain their needed environmentally sound technologies and know-how, conducive to addressing climate change.]
3. [The SBSTA shall undertake a comprehensive study of specific technology needs of developing countries and report on possible means of meeting the needs of developing countries.]
4. All technology transfers shall be conducted on [non-commercial and preferential terms; commercial terms].

#### **Article 11A: Financial Mechanism**

1. All developed country Parties shall provide new and additional financial resources to meet the agreed full costs incurred by developing country Parties in advancing the implementation of existing commitments.
3. Annex I countries shall increase total contributions to the Global Environmental Facility by a total of [10; 50; 100; 200] percent. Additional contributions will be allocated among Annex I countries in accordance with the United Nations schedule of contributions.
4. Special funding shall be provided to those countries vulnerable to the effects of climate change and/or response measures required under the protocol. Particular attention shall be paid to [low lying developing countries; low lying developing countries and oil producing states].

#### **Article 12: Clean Development Mechanism**

2. The purpose of the clean development mechanism shall be to assist Parties not included in Annex I in achieving sustainable development and in contributing to the ultimate objective of the Convention, and to assist Parties included in Annex I in achieving compliance with their quantified emission limitation and reduction commitments under Article 3.

10. [Investments in projects resulting in certified emission reduction credits shall be undertaken via direct government to government negotiation.; Investments in projects resulting in certified emission reduction credits shall be undertaken by private actors and/or Annex I government aid agencies.; Investment decisions for projects resulting in certified emission reduction credits shall be made by a panel composed of Parties to the Protocol elected by the COP.]
11. Certified emission reduction credits shall be granted for investments that [reduce emissions of non Annex I countries; reduce emissions of non Annex I countries and/or improve carbon sinks within non Annex I countries].
12. Non-Annex I countries [must; need not] accept emission reduction commitments defined in Annex B to be eligible for participation in the Clean Development Mechanism.

#### **Article 17: Emission Trading**

1. The Conference of the Parties shall define the relevant principles, modalities, rules and guidelines, in particular for verification, reporting and accountability for emissions trading. The Parties included in Annex B may participate in emissions trading for the purpose of fulfilling their commitments under Article 3. Any such trading shall be supplemental to domestic actions for the purpose of meeting quantified emissions limitation and reduction commitments under that Article.
2. Emissions trading shall be allowed [during the initial emission reduction period (2008-2012); to meet emission reduction commitments after 2012; subsequent to review of the workability of emissions trading after the year 2012].
3. For the purpose of meeting its commitments under Article 3, any Party included in [Annex I; Annex I excluding countries in transition; Annex B including non Annex I countries undertaking emission reduction commitments] may transfer to, or acquire from, any other such Party emission reduction units.

**Annex A****Greenhouse Gases:**

Carbon Dioxide  
 Methane  
 Nitrous Oxide  
 Hydrofluorocarbons  
 Perfluorocarbons  
 Sulphur hexafluoride

**Annex B**

Quantified Emission Limitation  
 Or Reduction Commitment

European Community	-8%
France	-8%
Germany	-8%
Italy	-8%
Spain	-8%
United Kingdom	-8%
United States	-7%
Japan	-6%
Canada	-6%
New Zealand	0%
Russia	0%
Norway	+1%
Australia	+8%

Developing Country [Voluntary Commitments; Mandated Commitments]

[Argentina]	[+10%; +20%; +50%]
[China]	[+10%; +20%; +50%]
[Costa Rica]	[+10%; +20%; +50%]
[India]	[+10%; +20%; +50%]
[Korea]	[+10%; +20%; +50%]
[Saudi Arabia]	[+10%; +20%; +50%]
[Tuvalu]	[+10%; +20%; +50%]
[Venezuela]	[+10%; +20%; +50%]

## Comments on the Negotiating Text

### Article 3:

Under 3.15 you must decide what percentage of country's total commitment can be comprised of reductions earned through flexibility mechanisms. This is a question of how much a country must do domestically, and how much it can achieve through international investments. You may choose among 0, 25, 50, 75, and 100 percent.

Article 3.16: Under Article 3.16, you have the option of including some form of developing country participation in the Protocol. You may reject 3.16, or you may include it with either a choice for developing countries to voluntarily adopt reduction commitments or be forced to adopt emission reduction commitments.

### Article 6:

Article 6 addresses issues pertaining to joint implementation. You may delete Article 6 or you may adopt it after addressing the bracketed wording.

Article 6.1: Under 6.1 you have the choice of allowing all Annex I countries, Annex I countries excluding the former communist states, or all Annex B countries including developing countries undertaking voluntary/required commitments. This is a question of where Joint Implementation investments can be made. Will the former Communist countries or developing countries, where significant investment options are available, be able to participate in joint implementation? The more countries the more economically efficient opportunities that are available, but it also wreaks of 'environmental colonialism.'

Article 6.5: Under 6.5 you have the choice of allowing Joint Implementation to be used by countries to meet their commitments during the first period, after the first period, or you can put the decision off until later.

Article 6.6: This section relates to whether countries will receive credit for JI projects currently operating under the Activities Implemented Jointly Pilot Phase. You may accept 6.6 and allow states to receive credit for current projects or delete 6.6 give no credit for current projects.

### Article 10C:

Article 10C addresses technology transfer issues. You may either delete this article or accept it with your decisions on the bracketed wording.

Article 10C.2 was proposed by China and the G-77 and would create a new body with the responsibility for facilitating technology transfer. The alternative is to delete this point and allow the existing bodies under the FCCC to address technology transfer.

Article 10C.3 would delay any action on technology transfer until after a comprehensive review of the issues surrounding technology transfer. This proposal was offered by the United State, the European Union, and Germany. You may either delete this point or accept it.

Article 10C.4 addresses the terms under which technology should be transferred. You have the choice between market terms and non-commercial/preferential terms (i.e. the technology should be given to developing countries at little or no cost).

### Article 11A:

Article 11A addresses issues surrounding the financial mechanism. You may either delete this article or accept it after agreeing upon the bracketed text.

Article 11A.3 addresses the question of how much additional funding should be provided to the GEF (or its successor body). You may decide to increase funding by 10, 50, 100, or 200 percent. The additional funds will be provided according to the UN schedule of contributions which means that the United States would pay the largest portion of any increase followed by Japan and Germany.

**Article 12:**

Article 12 provides definitions and principles for the Clean Development Mechanism. You may either delete this article or accept it following negotiations over the bracketed text.

Under Article 12.10 you must decide how investments and projects will be matched up. Should investment decisions be made via government to government negotiation; decided through negotiations with any interested parties (governments, companies, IGOs, or NGOs); or potential investors place their capital into a common fund to be disbursed according to the decisions of a panel created and elected by the COP.

Article 12.11 gives you the opportunity to include only emission reducing investments such as switching power plants from coal to gas or emission reducing investments and investments in sinks such as the planting of trees.

Under Article 12.12 you must decide whether countries must accept commitments defined in Annex B before being eligible to participate in the CDM.

**Article 17:**

Article 17 addresses emission trading. You may either delete this article or accept it after negotiating the bracketed text.

Article 17.2 determines when emission trading would be allowed. You may choose to allow it during the first period, after the first period, or you may postpone the decision to later.

Article 17.3 determines which countries may participate in emissions trading. You may allow only the advanced industrial countries, all advanced industrial countries plus the former communist states, or all Annex B countries including developing states that have accepted commitments under Annex B.

**Annex B**

Annex B sets out the commitments of the Parties to the protocol. Whether or not voluntary commitments are acceptable is determined by Article 3.15. If Article 3.15 is not accepted then there can be no voluntary commitments section of Annex B. If Article 3.15 is adopted then developing countries may either must accept one of the listed targets or they may choose to accept a target depending on the wording of Article 3.15.

## Climate Change Simulation Negotiating Incentives

Attached to this page is a table of political/economic/environmental costs and benefits to your country from the various alternatives in the negotiating text. These numbers are intended to be broadly representative of the negotiating incentives facing each of the individual countries. Each country has a different set of incentives. The point total listed at the end of each line is the net cost or benefit to your country from the alternative text listed on that line. A negative number means that the alternative is on the whole opposed to your interests in the negotiations. A positive number means that the alternative is consistent with your interests. It is possible that all of the alternatives under a particular option are negative. In the negotiations you will likely need to make your support of pieces of the text adversely affecting your interests contingent upon the support of your negotiating partners for sections of the text that may adversely affect their interests. Ultimately, you will have to work with your partners to create a final protocol which provides everyone with an agreement that, on the whole, supports their broad political, economic, and environmental interests.

For you to be successful in the negotiations, it is probably the best strategy to not show anyone your interest structure (at least initially). In your opening statement you will need to outline your country's position on what the final text should include. At that point you may want to misrepresent your true win-set to achieve the maximum in the final negotiations. You will be dealing with a set of pressures very similar to those faced by the actual negotiators. You will not know how far your partners will be willing to compromise. You will not know if you will be able to get everyone to agree. You will not know if you will be able to achieve an agreement in the limited amount of time that you have.

This negotiation simulation serves two primary purposes. First, it provides you with an opportunity to study the climate change issue in great detail and apply the material that you have studied throughout this course. Second, it gives you an opportunity to experience the process of negotiating a very complex agreement.

If you believe that your state's actual interests on a particular question are grossly out of line with your country's incentives table, you may appeal to have your incentives altered. You must present a well argued position on why your incentives should be changed. I will be the final judge on the incentive structure.

Two-thirds of your grade (100 pts.) on this negotiating session is based on your written position statement. The other third (50 pts.) is based on your ability to negotiate an agreement favorable to your country's interests. This part of your grade is determined by the sum of the scores for the alternatives in the negotiating text. The following list includes the scores that you must attain for your country to receive the associated points:

Negotiation Score	Grade Points	
750+	55 pts.	If a country does not sign the Protocol, the signatories to the agreement will have their scores docked by the number associated with the non-signing countries:
650	51	
600	49	
550	47	
450	45	
350	44	
		United States -250
		Any Member State of the European Union -250
		China/Japan -150 each
		Russia/India/Brazil -100 each
		Australia/Argentina/Switzerland/Norway - 50 each
		Tuvalu/Costa Rica/Venezuela/Saudi Arabia - 10 each

\*\*\* If your score is below 350 you may choose not to sign the protocol. If you do so, you will receive 42 points for the negotiations.

## United States

Art. 3.16	delete 3.16 may voluntarily shall	-300 130 275
Art. 3.15	25% 50% 75% 100%	-200 -50 50 150
Art. 6	Delete Art. 6	-150
Art. 6.1	Annex I Annex I - former Communist All Annex B (+ Developing)	35 -40 160
Art. 6.5	2008-2012 after 2012 after 2012 and further study	125 35 -60
Art. 10C	Delete Art. 10C	75
Art. 10C.2	Establish TTM Delete 10C.2	-75 45
Art. 10C.3	Further Study Delete 10C.3	5 -10
Art. 10C.4	Non-Commercial Terms Commercial Terms	-200 100
Art. 11A.3	10% 50% 100% 200%	50 0 -35 -150
Art. 11A.4	Developing Countries Developing & Oil Producing	50 -150
Art. 12	Delete CDM	-100
Art. 12.10	Government-Government Any Actor New Panel	-75 50 -100
Art. 12.11	Reduce Emissions Emissions & Sinks	-40 100
Art. 12.12	Must Accept Need Not Accept	85 5
Art. 17	Delete Art. 17	-300
Art. 17.2	2008-2012 after 2012 after Review	150 25 -100
Art. 17.3	Annex I Annex I - former Communist All Annex B (+ Developing)	55 -100 165
Annex B	Argentina/Brazil/India - All No Commitment Argentina/Brazil/India No Commitment - points per country 10% - points per country 20% - points per country 50% - points per country	-100 -40 100 50 25
Annex B	China No Commitment 10% 20% 50%	-150 350 200 100
Annex B	Saudi Arabia/OPEC/Nigeria/Venezuela All No Commitment 10% - points per country 20% - points per country 50% - points per country	-20 200 150 120

## Tuvalu/Small Island States

Art. 3.16	delete 3.16	-250
	may voluntarily	150
	shall	300
Art. 3.15	25%	500
	50%	200
	75%	25
	100%	-150
Art. 6	Delete Art. 6	-20
Art. 6.1	Annex I	50
	Annex I - former Communist	200
	All Annex B (+ Developing)	-20
Art. 6.5	2008-2012	-75
	after 2012	-25
	after 2012 and further study	85
Art. 10C	Delete Art. 10C	-50
Art. 10C.2	Establish TTM	120
	Delete 10C.2	-50
Art. 10C.3	Further Study	-15
	Delete 10C.3	25
Art. 10C.4	Non-Commercial Terms	85
	Commercial Terms	-50
Art. 11A.3	10%	-25
	50%	50
	100%	125
	200%	200
Art. 11A.4	Developing Countries	100
	Developing & Oil Producing	-100
Art. 12	Delete CDM	-125
Art. 12.10	Government-Government	15
	Any Actor	50
	New Panel	35
Art. 12.11	Reduce Emissions	100
	Emissions & Sinks	-75
Art. 12.12	Must Accept	50
	Need Not Accept	5
Art. 17	Delete Art. 17	150
Art. 17.2	2008-2012	-50
	after 2012	-25
	after Review	50
Art. 17.3	Annex I	15
	Annex I - former Communist	75
	All Annex B (+ Developing)	-50
Annex B	Argentina/Brazil/India - All No Commitment	-50
	Argentina/Brazil/India No Commitment - points per country	-15
	10% - points per country	100
	20% - points per country	50
	50% - points per country	25
Annex B	China No Commitment	-15
	10%	75
	20%	50
	50%	0
Annex B	Saudi Arabia/OPEC/Nigeria/Venezuela All No Commitment	-20
	10% - points per country	200
	20% - points per country	150
	50% - points per country	120

## Germany

Art. 3.16	delete 3.16	-20
	may voluntarily	130
	shall	40
Art. 3.15	25%	150
	50%	75
	75%	-25
	100%	-100
Art. 6	Delete Art. 6	-50
Art. 6.1	Annex I	40
	Annex I - former Communist	85
	All Annex B (+ Developing)	-25
Art. 6.5	2008-2012	-25
	after 2012	40
	after 2012 and further study	-25
Art. 10C	Delete Art. 10C	-85
Art. 10C.2	Establish TTM	-20
	Delete 10C.2	45
Art. 10C.3	Further Study	5
	Delete 10C.3	-10
Art. 10C.4	Non-Commercial Terms	-125
	Commercial Terms	100
Art. 11A.3	10%	-10
	50%	30
	100%	15
	200%	0
Art. 11A.4	Developing Countries	100
	Developing & Oil Producing	-200
Art. 12	Delete CDM	-55
Art. 12.10	Government-Government	-30
	Any Actor	40
	New Panel	-50
Art. 12.11	Reduce Emissions	100
	Emissions & Sinks	-100
Art. 12.12	Must Accept	-10
	Need Not Accept	50
Art. 17	Delete Art. 17	-80
Art. 17.2	2008-2012	-55
	after 2012	150
	after Review	0
Art. 17.3	Annex I	20
	Annex I - former Communist	80
	All Annex B (+ Developing)	-50
Annex B	Argentina/Brazil/India - All No Commitment	-20
	Argentina/Brazil/India No Commitment - points per country	-5
	10% - points per country	25
	20% - points per country	0
	50% - points per country	-10
Annex B	China No Commitment	-50
	10%	120
	20%	70
	50%	30
Annex B	Saudi Arabia/OPEC/Nigeria/Venezuela All No Commitment	-20
	10% - points per country	225
	20% - points per country	200
	50% - points per country	130

## China

Art. 3.16	delete 3.16	250
	may voluntarily	-100
	shall	-300
Art. 3.15	25%	120
	50%	40
	75%	-80
	100%	-160
Art. 6	Delete Art. 6	135
Art. 6.1	Annex I	80
	Annex I - former Communist	110
	All Annex B (+ Developing)	-125
Art. 6.5	2008-2012	-75
	after 2012	40
	after 2012 and further study	100
Art. 10C	Delete Art. 10C	-325
Art. 10C.2	Establish TTM	250
	Delete 10C.2	-50
Art. 10C.3	Further Study	-70
	Delete 10C.3	75
Art. 10C.4	Non-Commercial Terms	275
	Commercial Terms	-35
Art. 11A.3	10%	-40
	50%	10
	100%	50
	200%	120
Art. 11A.4	Developing Countries	25
	Developing & Oil Producing	-25
Art. 12	Delete CDM	-240
Art. 12.10	Government-Government	135
	Any Actor	-25
	New Panel	185
Art. 12.11	Reduce Emissions	75
	Emissions & Sinks	-10
Art. 12.12	Must Accept	-260
	Need Not Accept	200
Art. 17	Delete Art. 17	150
Art. 17.2	2008-2012	-80
	after 2012	-30
	after Review	70
Art. 17.3	Annex I	50
	Annex I - former Communist	125
	All Annex B (+ Developing)	-110
Annex B	Argentina/Brazil/India - All No Commitment	100
	Argentina/Brazil/India No Commitment - points per country	30
	10% - points per country	-300
	20% - points per country	-200
	50% - points per country	-150
Annex B	China No Commitment	150
	10%	-675
	20%	-500
	50%	-400
Annex B	Saudi Arabia/OPEC/Nigeria/Venezuela All No Commitment	-20
	10% - points per country	-20
	20% - points per country	-10
	50% - points per country	0

## Costa Rica

Art. 3.16	delete 3.16	-250
	may voluntarily	120
	shall	40
Art. 3.15	25%	-5
	50%	30
	75%	60
	100%	100
Art. 6	Delete Art. 6	-55
Art. 6.1	Annex I	-65
	Annex I - former Communist	-40
	All Annex B (+ Developing)	100
Art. 6.5	2008-2012	25
	after 2012	10
	after 2012 and further study	-45
Art. 10C	Delete Art. 10C	-150
Art. 10C.2	Establish TTM	100
	Delete 10C.2	-25
Art. 10C.3	Further Study	-45
	Delete 10C.3	40
Art. 10C.4	Non-Commercial Terms	140
	Commercial Terms	-35
Art. 11A.3	10%	-25
	50%	10
	100%	40
	200%	100
Art. 11A.4	Developing Countries	15
	Developing & Oil Producing	-15
Art. 12	Delete CDM	-80
Art. 12.10	Government-Government	-25
	Any Actor	45
	New Panel	-20
Art. 12.11	Reduce Emissions	-75
	Emissions & Sinks	150
Art. 12.12	Must Accept	160
	Need Not Accept	-25
Art. 17	Delete Art. 17	-185
Art. 17.2	2008-2012	125
	after 2012	40
	after Review	-85
Art. 17.3	Annex I	-115
	Annex I - former Communist	-70
	All Annex B (+ Developing)	145
Annex B	Argentina/Brazil/India - All No Commitment	50
	Argentina/Brazil/India No Commitment - points per country	15
	10% - points per country	-50
	20% - points per country	-25
	50% - points per country	-5
Annex B	China No Commitment	40
	10%	-10
	20%	-5
	50%	0
Annex B	Saudi Arabia/OPEC/Nigeria/Venezuela All No Commitment	-20
	10% - points per country	10
	20% - points per country	5
	50% - points per country	0

## India

Art. 3.16	delete 3.16	250
	may voluntarily	-100
	shall	-300
Art. 3.15	25%	120
	50%	40
	75%	-60
	100%	-160
Art. 6	Delete Art. 6	135
Art. 6.1	Annex I	80
	Annex I - former Communist	110
	All Annex B (+ Developing)	-125
Art. 6.5	2008-2012	-75
	after 2012	40
	after 2012 and further study	100
Art. 10C	Delete Art. 10C	-325
Art. 10C.2	Establish TTM	200
	Delete 10C.2	-50
Art. 10C.3	Further Study	-70
	Delete 10C.3	75
Art. 10C.4	Non-Commercial Terms	200
	Commercial Terms	-50
Art. 11A.3	10%	-40
	50%	10
	100%	65
	200%	120
Art. 11A.4	Developing Countries	25
	Developing & Oil Producing	-25
Art. 12	Delete CDM	-240
Art. 12.10	Government-Government	135
	Any Actor	-25
	New Panel	185
Art. 12.11	Reduce Emissions	75
	Emissions & Sinks	-10
Art. 12.12	Must Accept	-260
	Need Not Accept	200
Art. 17	Delete Art. 17	150
Art. 17.2	2008-2012	-80
	after 2012	-30
	after Review	70
Art. 17.3	Annex I	50
	Annex I - former Communist	125
	All Annex B (+ Developing)	-110
Annex B	Argentina/Brazil/India - All No Commitment	100
	Argentina/Brazil/India No Commitment - points per country	30
	10% - points per country	-200
	20% - points per country	-150
	50% - points per country	-100
Annex B	China No Commitment	75
	10%	-250
	20%	-200
	50%	-10
Annex B	Saudi Arabia/OPEC/Nigeria/Venezuela All No Commitment	-20
	10% - points per country	-20
	20% - points per country	-10
	50% - points per country	0

## Argentina

Art. 3.16	delete 3.16	-250
	may voluntarily	120
	shall	40
Art. 3.15	25%	-5
	50%	30
	75%	55
	100%	100
Art. 6	Delete Art. 6	-55
Art. 6.1	Annex I	-65
	Annex I - former Communist	-30
	All Annex B (+ Developing)	125
Art. 6.5	2008-2012	25
	after 2012	10
	after 2012 and further study	-45
Art. 10C	Delete Art. 10C	-150
Art. 10C.2	Establish TTM	150
	Delete 10C.2	-25
Art. 10C.3	Further Study	-45
	Delete 10C.3	40
Art. 10C.4	Non-Commercial Terms	140
	Commercial Terms	-30
Art. 11A.3	10%	-25
	50%	10
	100%	40
	200%	100
Art. 11A.4	Developing Countries	15
	Developing & Oil Producing	-15
Art. 12	Delete CDM	-80
Art. 12.10	Government-Government	45
	Any Actor	55
	New Panel	-20
Art. 12.11	Reduce Emissions	75
	Emissions & Sinks	35
Art. 12.12	Must Accept	160
	Need Not Accept	-35
Art. 17	Delete Art. 17	-185
Art. 17.2	2008-2012	125
	after 2012	40
	after Review	-85
Art. 17.3	Annex I	-115
	Annex I - former Communist	-50
	All Annex B (+ Developing)	145
Annex B	Argentina/Brazil/India - All No Commitment	-50
	Argentina/Brazil/India No Commitment - points per country	35
	10% - points per country	-100
	20% - points per country	-50
	50% - points per country	150
Annex B	China No Commitment	40
	10%	-25
	20%	-15
	50%	0
Annex B	Saudi Arabia/OPEC/Nigeria/Venezuela All No Commitment	-20
	10% - points per country	10
	20% - points per country	5
	50% - points per country	0

## Russia

Art. 3.16	delete 3.16	100
	may voluntarily	65
	shall	0
Art. 3.15	25%	-150
	50%	45
	75%	100
	100%	150
Art. 6	Delete Art. 6	-100
Art. 6.1	Annex I	150
	Annex I - former Communist	-200
	All Annex B (+ Developing)	-25
Art. 6.5	2008-2012	120
	after 2012	70
	after 2012 and further study	-45
Art. 10C	Delete Art. 10C	0
Art. 10C.2	Establish TTM	-20
	Delete 10C.2	30
Art. 10C.3	Further Study	5
	Delete 10C.3	0
Art. 10C.4	Non-Commercial Terms	-35
	Commercial Terms	50
Art. 11A.3	10%	5
	50%	-5
	100%	-20
	200%	-40
Art. 11A.4	Developing Countries	50
	Developing & Oil Producing	-50
Art. 12	Delete CDM	75
Art. 12.10	Government-Government	30
	Any Actor	5
	New Panel	25
Art. 12.11	Reduce Emissions	25
	Emissions & Sinks	-20
Art. 12.12	Must Accept	85
	Need Not Accept	-45
Art. 17	Delete Art. 17	-300
Art. 17.2	2008-2012	175
	after 2012	75
	after Review	-100
Art. 17.3	Annex I	150
	Annex I - former Communist	-200
	All Annex B (+ Developing)	25
Annex B	Argentina/Brazil/India - All No Commitment	50
	Argentina/Brazil/India No Commitment - points per country	5
	10% - points per country	-5
	20% - points per country	0
	50% - points per country	0
Annex B	China No Commitment	40
	10%	-50
	20%	-15
	50%	0
Annex B	Saudi Arabia/OPEC/Nigeria/Venezuela All No Commitment	-20
	10% - points per country	10
	20% - points per country	5
	50% - points per country	0

## Saudi Arabia

Art. 3.16	delete 3.16 may voluntarily shall	300 -15 -300
Art. 3.15	25% 50% 75% 100%	-50 -10 50 100
Art. 6	Delete Art. 6	-55
Art. 6.1	Annex I Annex I - former Communist All Annex B (+ Developing)	25 -50 50
Art. 6.5	2008-2012 after 2012 after 2012 and further study	-35 25 100
Art. 10C	Delete Art. 10C	-100
Art. 10C.2	Establish TTM Delete 10C.2	25 0
Art. 10C.3	Further Study Delete 10C.3	-45 40
Art. 10C.4	Non-Commercial Terms Commercial Terms	140 -15
Art. 11A.3	10% 50% 100% 200%	-5 10 30 55
Art. 11A.4	Developing Countries Developing & Oil Producing	-100 500
Art. 12	Delete CDM	-25
Art. 12.10	Government-Government Any Actor New Panel	30 45 -20
Art. 12.11	Reduce Emissions Emissions & Sinks	-50 80
Art. 12.12	Must Accept Need Not Accept	50 -10
Art. 17	Delete Art. 17	-100
Art. 17.2	2008-2012 after 2012 after Review	100 40 -50
Art. 17.3	Annex I Annex I - former Communist All Annex B (+ Developing)	20 -30 25
Annex B	Argentina/Brazil/India - All No Commitment Argentina/Brazil/India No Commitment - points per country 10% - points per country 20% - points per country 50% - points per country	100 25 -100 -50 -5
Annex B	China No Commitment 10% 20% 50%	175 -200 -100 -50
Annex B	Saudi Arabia/OPEC/Nigeria/Venezuela All No Commitment 10% - points per country 20% - points per country 50% - points per country	50 -1500 -1000 -750

**\*\*Special Dispensations:**

You will receive 55 grade points if you can induce the United States or the European Union to not sign the treaty.

You will also receive 2 extra grade points if you are forced to withdraw from the protocol--thus the minimum grade points you will receive for the negotiations is 45 instead of 43.